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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) based approaches have been the mainstream solution for anti-phishing detection. When they are
deployed on the client-side, ML-based classifiers are vulnerable to evasion attacks, as shown by recent attacks. However, such
potential threats have received relatively little attention because existing attacks destruct the functionalities or appearance of webpages
and are conducted in the white-box scenario, making it less practical. Consequently, it becomes imperative to understand whether it is
possible to launch evasion attacks with limited knowledge of the classifier, while preserving the functionalities and appearance.
In this work, we show that even in the grey-, and black-box scenarios, evasion attacks are not only effective on practical ML-based
classifiers, but can also be efficiently launched without destructing the functionalities and appearance. For this purpose, we propose
three mutation-based attacks, differing in the knowledge of the target classifier, addressing a key technical challenge: automatically
crafting an adversarial sample from a known phishing website in a way that can mislead classifiers. To launch attacks in the white- and
grey-box scenarios, we also propose a sample-based collision attack to gain the knowledge of the target classifier. We demonstrate the
effectiveness and efficiency of our evasion attacks on the state-of-the-art, Google’s phishing page filter, achieved 100% attack success
rate in less than one second per website. Moreover, the transferability attack on BitDefender’s industrial phishing page classifier,
TrafficLight, achieved up to 81.25% attack success rate. We further propose a similarity-based method to mitigate such evasion
attacks, Pelican, which compares the similarity of an unknown website with recently detected phishing websites. We demonstrate that
Pelican can effectively detect evasion attacks, hence could be integrated into ML-based classifiers. We also highlight two strategies of
classification rule selection to enhance the robustness of classifiers. Our findings contribute to design more robust phishing website
classifiers in practice.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
W EB phishing is a major cyber threat and have reacheda record volume [1], [2]. It has been widely used
to steal personal information such as login credentials. In
addition, people nowadays prefer online shopping, which
aggravates the harms of phishing attacks in practice. Conse-
quently, phishing attackers are able to gain a (vast) amount
of money via phishing websites [3]. To detect phishing at-
tacks, various anti-phishing solutions have been proposed,
such as blacklists [4], heuristic- [5], [6], similarity- [7], [8],
[9], [10], and machine learning (ML)-based [11], [12] ap-
proaches. However, blacklist is ineffective in detecting 0-day
attacks [4]; similarity- and heuristic-based approaches being
capable of detecting 0-day attacks, have limited scalability
and accuracy [5], [6]. ML-based ones are not only scalable
and accurate, but can also detect 0-day attacks, hence have
been widely studied [13], [14], [15], [16], [17] and deployed
in industrial browsers (e.g., Chrome and Edge [18]).
Prior research shows that ML-based classifiers are vul-
nerable to evasion attacks, e.g., [19], [20], [21], [22]. Such
attacks have been extensively studied in image recognition
and malware detection, but little has done in anti-phishing.
This is potentially due to the new challenge in this domain:
unlike adversarial images which only need to preserve the
appearance and adversarial malware which only need to pre-
serve the functionality, adversarial phishing websites have
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to preserve appearance and functionalities simultaneously,
to be more effective for web phishing [14]. Although, a
recent attack in this domain has been exhibited in the white-
box scenario [23], it received relatively little attention, due
to the following two limitations. (1) Their attack might
destruct functionalities and appearance of webpages; and
(2) they assume that an attacker has almost full knowledge
of the target classifier, for which more effective obfuscation
techniques [24] could be used to protect classifiers. Hence,
it becomes imperative to understand whether it is possible
to effectively launch evasion attacks on ML-based anti-
phishing classifiers with limited knowledge of the target
classifier, while preserving the functionalities and appear-
ance of the webpages.
In this work, we show that evasion attacks are not
only effective on practical ML-based classifiers, but can
also be launched without destructing functionalities and
appearance of phishing webpages, in all white-, grey-, and
black-box scenarios. For this purpose, we propose advanced
evasion attacks, differing in the knowledge (e.g., classi-
fication rules, features and weights) of a target classifier
obtained by the adversary, namely, white-box attack with
full knowlegde, grey-box attack with partial knowledge,
and black-box attack without any knowledge, of the ML-
based classifier under attack. Specifically, to effectively and
efficiently craft adversarial samples from known phishing
websites, we leverage mutation techniques [25], which are
widely-used in fuzz testing [26]. In our setting, we propose
three mutation mechanisms, each of which iteratively mu-
tates a sample from a known phishing website according to
the knowledge of the adversary until the target classifier is
misled. To launch attacks in white- and grey-box scenarios,
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2it is necessary to gain partial or full knowledge of the
classifier under attack. Therefore, we propose a sample-
based collision attack for inferring classification rules by
leveraging the data collected from legitimate and phishing
websites. In the white-box attack setting, where (almost)
full knowledge of the target classifier is obtained, we lever-
age a greedy algorithm [27] to choose which features to
delete from or add into a sample in order to maximally
decrease the decision score at each mutation step. In the
grey-box attack setting, where only partial knowledge of
the target classifier is obtained, we first iteratively delete all
the features of known classification rules that can reduce
the decision score, and if necessary, we add classification
rules that do not exist in original sample but can reduce the
decision score. In the black-box setting, where no classifier
information is exposed except that the adversary can query
the classifier and obtain the decision score, based on our
insights of existing ML-based classifiers, we first delete
DOM nodes (i.e., nodes in HMTL Document Object Model)
from the sample and then add DOM nodes into the sample,
guided by the decision scores.
To evaluate our attacks, we examined academic and
industrial ML-based tools (e.g., CANTINA+ [15], Off-the-
Hook [28], δPhish [16], the tool developed by Ubing et
al. [17], Monarch [29] and Google’s phishing page filter
(GPPF) [14]) and industrial proprietary tools (Bitdefender
TrafficLight [30], Netcraft Anti-Phishing Extension [31] and
360 Internet Protection [32]). Except for GPPF, all the other
tools either are not publicly accessible or cannot output
decision score for each input which is required even in our
black-box scenario. Thus, we demonstrate our attacks on
the state-of-the-art ML-based classifier GPPF. We emphasize
that many ML-based classifiers such as CANTINA+, Off-
the-Hook and Monarch use similar idea as GPPF, differ
in features, architectures, and machine learning algorithms.
Therefore, our attacks could be used to these ML-based clas-
sifiers. GPPF uses a logistic regression learning algorithm
to train a classification model and is effective in phishing
warnings [33]. It has been deployed in both Chrome and
Firefox [34], owning billions of users. In terms of false
positive rate and accuracy, GPPF is also the best one among
the 14 tools including similarity-, heuristic- and ML-based
ones [28]. To show that our black-box attack is generic and
effective for other practical ML-based classifiers, we launch
transferability attacks on the industrial tool Bitdefender
TrafficLight, which owns the most users and stars in the
add-ons of Firefox. Furthermore, Bitdefender TrafficLight
is proprietary without any publicly available information
about the internal design and implementations, hence com-
pletely black-box. We also tried to launch transferability
attacks on other anti-phishing tools, but failed to get their
classification results automatically. In summary, our attacks
have 4 prominent advantages:
• Effectiveness. Our attacks achieve 100% attack success
rate on GPPF in all the white-, grey-, and black-box
scenarios.
• Efficiency. Adversarial samples are crafted in less than
one second per seed in average.
• Transferability. The transferability attack success rate
on Bitdefender TrafficLight is up to 81.25%.
• Nondestructiveness. All the crafted adversarial sam-
ples have the same functionalities and appearance as
their original ones, where appearance is measured by
two common distortion criterions of images: mean-
squared error (MSE) [35] and mean-absolute error
(MAE) [36].
To mitigate the realistic threats posed by evasion attacks,
we propose a similarity-based method, named Pelican,
which compares the similarity of DOM tress between an
unknown one and recently detected phishing websites. This
method neither modifies the target classifier nor relies on
specific properties of the classifier, so it could be used to pro-
tect a wide range of classifiers as a pre-filter. We remark that
Pelican is used to efficiently detect evasion attacks rather
than general phishing attacks as done by existing work (e.g.,
[37], [8], [7], [9], [10]). Furthermore, to mitigate collision
attacks and enhance the robustness of classifiers, we iden-
tify weaker classification rules and propose two strategies:
removing single classification rules and subset classification rules
from classifiers. We also suggest adding more appearance-
related features into these classification rules to increase the
robustness of the classifier. Our findings contribute to design
more robust phishing website classifiers in practice. We
evaluate Pelican on 915 adversarial samples (one sample per
seed and scenario). Pelican is able to detect all these samples.
We also evaluate classification rule selection strategies using
our black-box attacks and demonstrate their weakness, but
have no side-effect on checking original phishing/benign
websites when subset rules or single rules are disabled.
In this work, we make the following contributions.
• Novel evasion attacks on ML-based web phishing clas-
sifiers, which are effective, efficient, and nondestruc-
tive.
• A sample-based collision attack which can effectively
infer more features/rules for grey- and white-box eva-
sion attacks. It is more effective and efficient than the
recent collision attack technique [23].
• Evaluation of our attacks which achieved 100% attack
success rate on the state-of-the-art classifier GPPF and
achieved up to 81.25% transferability attack success rate
on Bitdefender TrafficLight, in the real world.
• A defense method, Pelican, to mitigate evasion attacks,
and two strategies (i.e., removing single classification
rules and subset classification rules) to enhance the
robustness of the classifiers.
• A dataset [38] including 3,000 phishing websites, 15,000
legitimate website URLs and 2,566,834 phishing URLs
to foster further research such as phishing website
detection/defense and measurement.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
of evasion attacks on practical ML-based phishing website
classifiers in the grey- and black-box scenarios, the first
defense work against evasion attacks in this domain and
the first evaluation of robustness of single classification
rules and subset classification rules under the adversarial
environment.
32 BACKGROUND
2.1 Website and Webpage Structure
A website consists of webpages for presenting information
to users. Webpages are accessed via their corresponding
URLs. As shown in Fig. 1, a webpage has a basic structure
and multiple corresponding elements, representing in a tree
hierarchy, called DOM tree. Specifically, a webpage has sev-
eral kinds of nodes, called DOM nodes, including element
(e.g., HTML element), text (e.g., text inside the HTML ele-
ment), attribute (e.g., the attributes of each HTML element),
and comment codes (no effect on webpage structure).
http(s)://www.pelican.xyz URL
Webpage
Attribute Text Text 
Root element
<html>
Element Element 
Element Attribute
Fig. 1: Structure of a webpage.
The children of an element node are text and attribute
nodes. In addition, scripts such as JavaScript code are
also an important part of webpages which can manipulate
(e.g., modify, delete, and add) the DOM tree. In this work, we
consider JavaScript only, other scripting languages can be
handled similarly. The appearance and functionalities of a
webpage are determined by the combination of elements,
texts, attributes, and scripts.
2.2 Web Phishing
Web phishing, a type of social engineering attacks [39], [40],
is often used to steal user information, such as login cre-
dentials and payment data [41]. It occurs when an attacker
masquerades the phishing website as a trusted entity, both
of the webpages and URLs are very close to the original
legitimate ones [42]. Typically, attackers first create a fake
website and then distribute its URL to lure users to click the
URL link, which redirects to a phishing website from un-
trusted servers to extract users’ information [43] . Attackers
aim to make the phishing URLs and visual appearances of
webpages as similar as possible to the targeted victim’s.
Two traditional strategies are often adopted in web
phishing: spoofed emails and fake websites [43], [44]. Typically,
attackers first create a fake website and then send numerous
spoofed emails to various users. The spoofed emails lure
users to click links in the email that redirects to a phishing
website from untrusted servers to extract users’ information.
Attackers aim to make the phishing URLs and visual ap-
pearances of webpages as similar as possible to the targeted
victim’s.
2.3 ML-based Anti-Phishing
Generally, ML-based anti-phishing methods extract a set of
features of text, image, or URL information from DOM trees
of authentic and/or phishing websites. A set of classification
rules obtained from the learning algorithms are used for
phishing detection [45]. According to the existing ML-based
anti-phishing solutions such as [6], [15], [14], [28], [16], [17],
[29], [46], we define a generic ML-based phishing classifier c as
a tuple
c , (R, pi, τ),
where R is a finite set of classification rules, pi is a function
used to compute the final decision score of a given website,
and τ is the threshold. Classification rules are described as
follows:
Rule: r = (idr, Fr, wr)
Feature: f = (nf , vf )
Node: n = (ntype, ntag, nchildren, nv)
A classification rule r consists of an identity idr , a set
of features Fr , and a weight wr contributing to the final
decision score. We denote by W = (wr)r∈R the set of
weights. A feature f has a value vf which is computed
from a set nf of DOM nodes of webpages. The values of
features in Fr determine the value of r. For example, a
feature PageHasForms examines whether a webpage has
a form node, and its value is either 1 or 0. A DOM node has
a type ntype (e.g., element, attribute, text) and a tag name
ntag (e.g., “div”). An element node has children nchildren
that are attribute and text nodes. An attribute or text node
has a value nvalue. For example, a “type” attribute node
has the value “password” and a text node has the value
“Hello World!”. In practise, classification rules are usually
designed according to domain knowledge of experts, while
their weights are trained from some dataset using machine
learning algorithms.
A classification rule r is hit by a website p, denoted by
p |= r, only if all the values of its features in p are non-
zero. To check a website p, it computes the decision score
scorec(p) based on weights of classification rules hit by
p using the function pi. It is considered to be a phishing
one if the decision score exceeds a predefined threshold, i.e.,
scorec(p) ≥ τ, otherwise it is regarded as a legitimate one.
Although, classifiers may differ in concrete anti-phishing
solutions, our definition is generic and is able to capture
cores of many published ML-based solutions, e.g., [6], [15],
[14], [28], [16], [17], [29], [46].
3 THREAT MODEL AND OVERVIEW
In this section, we propose our threat model, and then
introduce the overview of our study.
3.1 Threat Model
We assume that an attacker wants to craft a sample from a
desired phishing website that has the same functionalities
and appearance, but is misclassified as benign by the target
classifier; and (s)he can query to the classifier as many
times as possible. This is feasible in practice, as limiting the
number of query times will restrict the usage of the classifier.
We consider three attack scenarios: white-, grey-, and
black-box. White-box means that the adversary has almost
full knowledge of the target classifiers (i.e., both classifi-
cation rules and their weights). Grey-box means that the
adversary has access to classification rules, but not their
4Classifier
 ③                                             
Collision 
Attack
• White-box
• Grey-box
• Black-box
Evasion Attack
Attack
know-
ledge
Defense
Phishings
Legitimates
Collision Dataset
①
②
④ Webpage
Structure
Extraction
Webpage
Structure
Extraction
Similarity
Analysis
Fig. 2: Overview of our study.
weights, of the classifier under attack, since the weights
of classifiers may be frequently updated in practice. For
instance, Google retrains GPPF daily on the server-side
using samples from classification data collected over the last
three months and updates the weights of GPPF on the client-
side [14]. By launching grey-box attacks, the adversary does
not need to infer the weights of the classification rules,
hence boosting attack efficiency. In the more realistic black-
box setting, the adversary does not have any knowledge of
the target classifiers. In all three scenarios, the adversary
does not know any information of the training dataset and
training algorithm.
White- and grey-box attacks are feasible for classifiers
that are deployed on the client-side [14]. Indeed, thought
labor intensive, classification rules (and their weights) can
be explored through previously published work and many
state-of-the-art techniques (e.g., reverse engineering [47] and
collision attacks [48]). Consequently, the attacker may have
full or partial knowledge of the classifier under attack,
allowing (s)he to launch a white- or grey-box evasion attack
on the target classifier.
We also assume that the classifier outputs the decision
score of each input sample, which is a widely used assump-
tion even in black-box scenario [19], [20], [49], [50]. We will
demonstrate that our approach is effective in transferability
attacks, allowing us to attack classifiers that only output
category of each input instead of the decision score.
3.2 Approach Overview
Fig. 2 shows the overview of our work on attacks and
defenses of phishing classifiers: including advanced evasion
attacks in white-, grey-, and black-box scenarios and an
effective similarity-based method for evasion attack detec-
tion. We first propose a sample-based collision to get the
knowledge of classifiers such as classification rules and
their corresponding weights (marked ¬). Second, given a
desired phishing website that can be successfully classified
as phishing by the classifier under attack, according to the
knowledge the attacker obtained, (s)he leverages evasion at-
tacks to craft adversarial samples that mislead the classifier
(marked ­).
In the defense part, when the original one is identi-
fied as phishing by the classifier, its webpage structures
are extracted (marked ®) for evasion attack detection. We
propose an effective similarity-based method named Pelican
(marked ¯), which compares the similarity of DOM trees
between an unknown one with recently detected phishing
websites. If the similarity exceeds a pre-defined threshold,
TABLE 1: Dataset used in this work
Dataset Types Number Source
Phishing URLs 2,566,834 PHISHTANK
Phishing Websites 3,000 PHISHTANK
Legitimate URLs 15,000 PHISHNET
Legitimate Websites 15,000 PHISHNET
we regard the input website as a phishing one constructed
by evasion attacks, but without invoking the ML-based
classifier.
We further come up with two classification rule selection
strategies for enhancing the robustness of the classifiers and
increasing the attack cost.
4 ADVANCED EVASION ATTACKS
In this section, we propose a class of advanced evasion at-
tacks under three different attack scenarios. Given a desired
phishing website p, an evasion attack on a target classifier
c = (R, pi, τ) is to craft an adversarial sample mutated
from p that can mislead the classifier c, according to the
knowledge of c the attacker obtained.
To explain our approach, we will use GPPF as the target
classifier, which is trained by a gradient descent logistic re-
gression learning algorithm. Recall that all the other tools we
examined either are not publicly accessible or cannot output
decision score (cf. Section 1), therefore, we demonstrate our
generic methods on the state-of-the-art classifier GPPF. In
GPPF cGPPF = (R, pi, τ), R consists of 2,130 classification
rules that rely upon 995 features in total; the decision score
function pi is defined as:
pi(x) =
ex
1 + ex
,
where x = wr1 +
∑2130
i=2 (wri ·
∏
f∈Fri vf ) and the threshold
τ is 0.5.
4.1 Sample-based Collision Attack
To lanuch a grey- or white-box attack on a target classifier,
it is necessary, but non-trivial, to obtain full or partial
information of the classifier.
4.1.1 Data preparation
As shown in Table 1, we collect phishing websites from
PHISHTANK [51], and legitimate websites from PHISH-
NET [52], as subjects to infer classification rules. We only
collect URLs of inactive phishing websites. Finally, we col-
lected 3,000 phishing websites and 2,566,834 URLs from
PHISHTANK and 15,000 legitimate websites with their cor-
responding webpages from PHISHNET.
Specific data should be extracted from the collected
websites in order to launch collision attacks, as features may
differ in classifiers. As aforementioned, we demonstrate our
methods using GPPF as the target classifier. GPPF consists
of three categories of features: URL-related, Dom-related,
and term-related features, as shown in Table 2. URL-related
features come from URLs, containing 4 types of features.
Dom-related features come from links and action fields (e.g.,
form element) in webpages, containing 2 types of features.
Term-related features are collected from texts in webpages,
5TABLE 2: Extracted features in GPPF
Feature Categories Feature Types
URL-related UrlTld=∗, UrlDomain=∗UrlOtherHostToken=∗, UrlPathToken=∗
Dom-related PageActionURL=∗, PageLinkDomain=∗
Term-related PageTerm=∗
including one type of features (i.e., PageTerm). We extract
all links and texts from the collected websites and URLs as
the dataset for inferring classification rules of GPPF.
4.1.2 Collision attacks
We demonstrate how to infer classification rules in GPPF by
leveraging the collected dataset. The main goal is to iden-
tify the features used in classification rules. GPPF uses the
SHA-256 hash algorithm to protect these features. There-
fore, we compute hash value of each feature in the dataset
using the SHA-256 hash algorithm. We then compare its
hash value with the hard-coded hash values in the source
code of GPPF. If it matches one of the hard-coded hash
values in GPPF, then the feature is identified. It remains to
understand the semantics of the identified features, which
is required to launch white- and grey-box attacks. However,
it is difficult to recognize it from the feature names. For
example, it is hard to guess the semantics of the feature
PageLinkDomain=∗, which actually means that “a” element
with the “href” attribute whose value is string (i.e., ∗
denotes wildcard). To address this problem, we manually
extract the semantics of each feature from the code of GPPF.
The results are shown in Table 4, which will be explained
in detail in Section 4.4. This approach is not limited to the
SHA-256 hash algorithm or GPPF, instead, we believe it could be
used for other hash algorithms and client-side classifiers.
4.2 Mutation Mechanisms
We propose three mutation mechanisms for white-, grey-
and black-box evasion attacks, which craft adversarial sam-
ples by leveraging mutation techniques. During mutation,
we always preserve the appearance and functionalities of
the websites. This is achieved by carefully designing mu-
tation operations for implementing our mutation mecha-
nisms. Since changing URLs of websites is very easy for an
attacker in real scenarios, but it is difficult to automatically
craft adversarial samples via mutating URLs in order to
maintain similarity to victim’s URLs. Therefore, we do not
try to modify URLs in our evasion attacks.
4.2.1 White-box Attacks
To evade a classifier with its full knowledge, we should mu-
tate a sample starting from a phishing website by deleting
or adding classification rules until the decision score is less
than the threshold. The challenge is how to choose such
classification rules. Since classification rules can contribute
to the decision score either positively or negatively, we
partition the classification rules into two sets:
• R+ = {r ∈ R | wr > 0} the set of positive classification
rules indicating when being added the decision score
will increase,
• R− = {r ∈ R | wr < 0} the set of negative classification
rules indicating when being added the decision score
will decrease.
We address the challenge by deleting positive classifica-
tion rules and add negative classification rules, so that the
decision score finally becomes less than the threshold. We
leverage a greedy algorithm to choose which classification
rules to add or delete aiming at maximally decreasing the
decision score at each mutation step. It is worth noting that
once a feature is deleted, all the classification rules relying
on this feature are also deleted. On the other hand, in order
to add a classification rule, all the features relied by this
classification rule should be added. Therefore, we regard
each feature of negative classification rules as a mutation
“atom” during deletion operation, and regard each positive
classification rule as a mutation “atom” during addition
operation instead of individual features. At each mutation
step, features and classification rules are selected based on
their influence on the decision score.
For each feature f that appears in the website p, we
define the influence δ(p, f) of f as
δ(p, f) ,
∑
r∈R(f)∩p|=r(wr ·
∏
f ′∈Fr vf ′),
where vf ′ denotes the value of feature f ′ in p and R(f)
denotes the set of classification rules that rely upon f .
Intuitively, δ(p, f) is the diff of weights after deleting the
feature f .
To add one negative classification rule r, all the features
of r should be added, by which more than one classification
rules may be added, hence adding the features of one
classification rule may result in the addition of more than
one classification rules. Therefore, we define the influence
δ(p, r) of a classification rule r as
δ(p, r) ,
∑
r′∈R∧p 6|=r′∧Fr′⊆Fr (wr′ ·
∏
f ′∈Fr′ vf ′),
indicating the diff of weights after adding all the features of
the classification rule r.
Now, we describe the procedure of our white-box attack.
For a given phishing website p, we iteratively mutate p
as follows until its decision score becomes less than the
threshold:
1) if there exists a feature f of a positive classification
rule such that δ(p, f) > 0, δ(p, f) ≥ δ(p, f ′) for all
other features f ′ of positive classification rules, and
δ(p, f) ≥ |δ(p, r)| for all negative classification rules r,
then delete f from the website p; otherwise goto step 2.
2) if there is a negative classification rule r in the website p
such that δ(p, r) < 0 and δ(p, r) ≤ δ(p, r′) for all other
negative classification rules r′, then add the classification
rule r (i.e., all the features of r) into p; otherwise termi-
nate.
4.2.2 Grey-box Attacks
In grey-box scenario, the attacker knows classification rules,
but not weights of the classification rules. Therefore, it is
impossible to choose the best features or classification rules
so that the decision score can be reduced maximally at each
mutation step. For efficiency consideration, based on our
insights of ML-based classifiers (cf. Section 6.2), we first
iteratively delete features that can reduce the decision score;
if the decision score is still no less than the threshold after
6deleting all such features, we add other classification rules
of the target classifier that do not exist in the website and
check which classification rule can reduce the decision score
until no more classification rules can be added. We stop
deleting/adding once the decision score becomes less than
the threshold. Since we do not know the weights of rules,
feature deletion and addition operations may be interleaved
during mutation.
4.2.3 Black-box Attacks
In black-box scenario, the attacker neither knows classifi-
cation rules nor their weights. Hence, it is impossible to
directly delete/add classification rules or features during
mutation. To overcome this problem, we iteratively add
and/or modify DOM nodes, instead of classification rules
or features. According to our insight of existing classification
rules in ML-based classifiers, we find that: (1) deleting one
feature leads to the deletion of all rules that rely on this fea-
ture, and (2) to add a rule, all the features of this rule should
be added. Therefore, we first iteratively modify DOM nodes.
If the decision score becomes less than the threshold, we
stop mutating. Otherwise, we iteratively and randomly add
nodes that are extracted from legitimate websites, but do
not exist in the phishing website, to reduce the decision
score. If the decision score becomes smaller, we continue
mutating the current website. Otherwise, we continue mu-
tating the previous one. We will elaborate details in the
next subsection. All these operations are carefully designed
in order to preserve functionality and appearance of the
phishing webpage, but without using the obtained features
and weights. Details
4.3 Mutation Operations
According to the above mechanisms, our white- and grey-
box attacks need to delete and/or add features. These
operations are achieved by manipulating DOM nodes, the
same as in black-box scenario. We extract the DOM nodes
related to a feature, and add/delete this feature by ma-
nipulating these nodes. For example, consider the feature
named PageHasPswdInputs in GPPF, here we assume
that “PageHasPswdInputs = True” in the sample web-
site. To delete this feature, we identify the nodes (i.e.,
input) related to this feature, then modify these nodes to
break “PageHasPswdInputs = True”. Hence, manipulat-
ing DOM nodes is a key operation to achieve our evasion
attacks. However, directly manipulating DOM nodes will
destruct appearance and/or functionalities of webpages,
which are determined by the DOM tree and their nodes.
To address this challenge, we introduce two mutation op-
erations: node “addition” and node “modification”, which
respectively adds and modifies DOM nodes so that (G1)
the values of features in positive classification rules become
zero, or (G2) the values of features in negative classification
rules become positive, but without destructing the appear-
ance and functionalities.
4.3.1 Node Modification
To achieve G1 or G2, we illustrate node modification for
different types of nodes (i.e., attribute nodes and text nodes)
as follows.
TABLE 3: Modifiable function-related attributes where ∗
refers to the “type” attribute in “input” element, which
can be deleted only when its value is “reset”, “button”, or
“password”.
Element Function-related Attributes Event
button
form, formaction, formenctype,
formmethod, formnovalidate, formtarget,
name, type, value
onclick
input
accept, submit, text, type∗, step, size,
required, name, placeholder, min, max,
formtarget, formnovalidate, formmethod,
formenctype, formaction, form, accept
onfocus
form action, enctype, method, name, novalidate, target oninput
a download, href, hreflang, media, rel, target, type onclick
table summary onmousemove
Attribute nodes. Attribute nodes are modified by replacing
them with other grammars, so that these nodes will not be
the features of the classifier. For instance, we can use “event”
in HTML to achieve this goal. HTML4 and HTML5 support the
event trigger actions in a browser, and the effect is the same
as executing a script when a user clicks on an element. In
addition, in order to ensure the same appearance, we also
need to add the style attribute. For instance, the attribute
“type” whose value is “submit” in the button element can
be modified, as shown below.
<s t y l e type=” t e x t /c s s ”>button [ type=submit ]{ height : 3 8
px}</s t y l e>
<button type=”submit”></button> // o r i g i n a l
We replace the attribute “type” with value “submit” by
leveraging the “onclick” event, parse the “css” file and
“style” tags to find the styles defined for the button, and
add these styles to the button so that the appearance of
the button remain unchanged. The crafted button is shown
below.
<button s t y l e = ’ height : 3 8 px ; ’ o n c l i c k =” t h i s . type = ’
submit ’ ”;></button> // c r a f t e d
It is very difficult for the users to perceive such changes
since the two actions do not destruct the appearance and
functionality of webpages. Table 3 lists the function-related
attribute nodes which can be modified. We remark that
not all attribute nodes can be modified, as some of them
are related to webpage appearance (e.g., “align” attribute
in a “p” element and “background” attribute in a “body”
element) unless the appearance can be imitated by chang-
ing “style” attribute. For example, we cannot modify the
attribute “type” whose value is “radio” in “input” element,
because its appearance cannot be imitated by changing
“style” attribute.
Text nodes. Classifiers usually check text through string
comparison. Thus, we can modify text nodes by inserting
an invisible (e.g., the zero-width space “&#8203;”) character,
which looks like that it does not exist. For example, a text
node “Hello World!” in a “p” element, as shown below
<p>Hello World!</p> // o r i g i n a l
It can be modified by inserting the character “&#8203;”
between “l” and “o”, displayed the same as the original one,
resulting in the following code:
<p>Hell &#8203;o World!</p> // c r a f t e d
74.3.2 Node Addition
In order to preserve the appearance and functionalities of
webpages, we demonstrate node addition by adding invis-
ible element nodes, i.e., with no size and color. We remark
that the parent of an attribute or text node is an element
node. If the element node is invisible, then all its children
are also invisible. Therefore, to add attribute and text nodes,
we add them as children of an invisible element node.
However, in black-box scenario, we do not know any in-
formation of the classifier and thus cannot determine which
node to add in order to hit negative classification rules after
node modification. We assume that there are more negative
classification rules in legitimate websites than in phishing
ones. Therefore, based on this assumption, we collect three
types of nodes (i.e., element nodes, attribute nodes, and text
nodes) from the collected legitimate websites. After that, we
randomly select nodes from the collected data and add them
into the target website. To avoid adding useless nodes in
black-box scenario, we come up with a rollback mechanism.
Specifically, if the decision score does not decrease after
adding a specified number (e.g., 3) of nodes, we rollback
to the previous sample and continue to add other nodes.
Otherwise, we continue adding nodes into the latest one.
In summary, all nodes can be added into the webpages,
but only attribute and text nodes can be modified accord-
ing to mutation operations.
Though our node modification and addition are simple,
they are effective in our experiments. It might be able to
improve resilience of classifiers by proposing new clas-
sification rules following disclosure of our findings, we
believe more sophisticated methods (e.g., script and Shadow
DOM [53]) could be leveraged to achieve node modification
and addition, which are widely used in legitimate websites,
but very difficult to analyze statically.
4.4 Concretizing Our Attacks on GPPF
In this section, we show how to concretize our attacks
on the classifier GPPF. Table 4 lists all features excluding
URL-related features in GPPF. As aforementioned, all the
features can be added, while only some features can be
deleted. For example, the feature PageHasForms denotes
whether a webpage has a “form” node. The “form” node
is an element node which cannot be modified. We cannot
delete features 4 and 5 neither, as they are appearance-
related attribute nodes. Features 6, 7, 8 and 9 representing
the frequency of special links can be deleted by adding
links whose domain is internal. When the frequency value
is lower than a predefined threshold in GPPF, GPPF cannot
detect such features. We cannot delete script-related features
10 and 11, as deleting them may affect the functionalities of
websites.
Features 2, 3, 12 and 13 can be deleted by using the
attribute nodes (e.g., event) which implement the same
functionality, but making them undetectable by the classi-
fier. For example, feature 3 indicates whether the website
has an “input” element whose “type” is “password”, as
shown below:
<s t y l e type=” t e x t /c s s ”>input [ type=password ]{width : 8
px;}</ s t y l e>
<input type=”password” /> // o r i g i n a l
After modifying it using the event attribute node, it
becomes
<input s t y l e =”width : 8 px” onfocus=” t h i s . type = ‘
password ’ ” /> // c r a f t e d
Thus, the classifier cannot detect this feature. For feature 14,
we can delete it directly since it is a term-related feature.
5 DEFENSE METHODS
In this section, we first propose a similarity-based defense
method, named Pelican, to detect evasion attacks. Pelican
addresses the scenario where a phishing website is already
detected by a classifier, and the attacker is trying to mutate
it to mislead the classifier. We then propose two classifica-
tion rule selection strategies to increase attack cost, hence
enhancing the robustness of the classifier.
5.1 Similarity-based Evading Detection
Our detection is based on the following two observations
of mutation based evasion attacks: (1) adding or deleting
features do change the structures of the webpages, but, (2)
the change is limited. Therefore, if a website has a high
“similarity” compared with a recently detected phishing
one, we regard it as an adversarial sample crafted by evasion
attacks. We remark that our approach aims at detecting
evasion attacks rather than general phishing attacks. It can
be deployed with a ML-based classifier to prevent from
mutation based evasion attacks.
5.1.1 DOM Tree Similarity (Baseline)
We first propose to compute the similarity of DOM trees as
baseline. We denote by T and T ′ two DOM trees of a re-
cently detected phishing website and an unknown website.
If the similarity between T and T ′ is high, we conclude that
T ′ is mutated from T , thus successfully identify the crafted
phishing website without using the machine learning-based
classifiers.
In detail, we traverse the DOM trees T and T ′ using a
breadth first search algorithm and compute the hash values
of the element nodes in each layer. As there are two types
of nodes (i.e., text nodes and attribute nodes) that rely on
an element node, thus, to measure the similarity of two
element nodes, we compare both the hash values of their
text and attribute nodes. We only consider the similarity of
two elements with the same tag name. If two elements have
distinct tag names, they are regarded as different elements.
The similarity of elements in the ith layer is defined as:
similarityele(Ei, E
′
i) ,
|ai1∩ai2|
|ai1∪ai2| +
|ti1∩ti2|
|ti1∪ti2|
where ai1 (resp. a
i
2) denotes the set of attribute nodes belong-
ing to the element node Ei (resp. E′i), t
i
1 (resp. t
i
2) denotes
the set of text nodes belonging to the element node Ei (resp.
E′i). Finally, we compute the proportion of the common
nodes commi with the same hash values against all the nodes
of the current layer i in two DOM trees. The similarity
similaritytree(T, T
′) between T and T ′ is defined as the
average common nodes of each layer, i.e.,
similaritytree(T, T
′) ,
∑m
i=1
`i
m
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Fig. 3: Application scenario in practice.
where m is the maximal number of layers in the DOM trees,
`i , commi|ni1∪ni2| and commi ,
∑|ni1∪ni2|
j=1 similarityele(Ej, E
′
j),
ni1 (resp. n
i
2) denotes the set of element nodes at the i
th layer
of T (resp. T ′).
5.1.2 Personalized Similarity (Pelican)
The DOM tree similarity method (baseline) is effective to
detect most crafted samples, but failed on several cases, e.g.,
adversarial samples crafted by the grey-box attack. After an
in-depth analysis, we found there are four types of features
related to “frequency”, namely, features at No. 6-9 in Table 4.
In order to evade classifiers, it requires to add or modify
a large number of nodes, which may significantly reduce
the DOM tree similarity, occurring in our grey-box scenario.
In addition, if the attacker obtains the knowledge of our
DOM tree similarity method, (s)he may add more irrelevant
nodes or attributes, invisible elements, and layers to reduce
the similarity. However, it is difficult to directly remove the
nodes and attributes without destructing the appearance
and functionalities. Therefore, we propose a personalized
similarity method, named Pelican, that is defined as follows:
similarityele Pelican(Ei, E
′
i) , |a
i
1∩ai2|
|ai1|
+
|ti1∩ti2|
|ti1|
,
similarityPelican(T, T
′) ,
∑m
i=1
`i
m
, `i , commi|ni1| and
commi ,
∑|ni1|
j=1 similarityele Pelican(Ej, E
′
j)
where similarityele Pelican(Ei, E′i) is the similarity of ele-
ments in the ith layer by using Pelican, m is the number of
layers in the DOM tree T , and ni denotes the set of element
nodes at the ith layer in T . In particular, to defend against
attacks that insert layers into the DOM tree during mutation,
Pelican continues comparing the next layer of T ′ until the
two layers are similar. If all the remaining layers are not
similar enough, we just rollback to compute the similarity
of elements in the same layer.
5.1.3 Application Scenario in Practice
Fig. 3 depicts the application scenario of our defense method
Pelican in practice. For each website, the system first queries
whitelist and blacklist to quickly identify legitimate and
known phishing website in a standard way. Whitelist and
blacklist can be customized by users or use third-party
resources [54], [16], [51], [52]. If the website is neither in
whitelist nor blacklist, then Pelican is applied to check
whether the website is crafted by an evasion attack. If it
is an evasion attack, a phishing warn alerts without passing
to the ML-based classifier. Otherwise, ML-based classifier is
used to check the website. The website is added into the
phishing website database for Pelican if it is classified as
a phishing one. To avoid storing all the detected phishing
websites, we only need to store either recent k phishing
websites and/or the phishing websites detected in recent
h hours. By doing so, Pelican can prevent from querying
directly and efficiently to the ML-based classifiers by the
attackers, but still detect phishing attacks.
5.2 Classification Rule Selection
In order to enhance the robustness of the classifiers, we in-
troduce two classification rule selection strategies to increase
attack cost.
Negative subset classification rule pruning. Given two
classification rules r and r′, we say r′ is a sub-rule of r, if
the set of features of r subsumes the one of r′. Such subset
classification rules decrease the attack overhead, because
if the attacker has inferred the classification rule r′, then
the classification rule r as well. Attackers can improve the
attack effectiveness and efficiency by leveraging negative
subset classification rules. When the attacker adds all the
features of a negative classification rule r into a website,
both classification rules r and r′ will be added into the
sample. Therefore, the mutation can maximally reduce the
decision score by adding all features of r. To enhance the
robustness of the classifiers, it is better to prune subset clas-
sification rules, which is demonstrated by our experiments
(cf. Section 6.4.2).
Single classification rule pruning. A classification rule is
single if it relies on features that are not relied by any
other classification rules. Single classification rules are com-
pletely independent to other classification rules, deleting or
adding them will not affect any other classification rules.
Therefore, attackers can aggressively add all negative single
classification rules if they are addable, which can definitely
reduce the decision score. In addition, in white-box scenario,
attackers can also directly delete all positive single classifi-
cation rules. Addition and deletion of single classification
rules are very efficient and do not have any side effect
to other classification rules. Therefore, single classification
rules have a potentially severe hazard to classifiers, and
should be pruned in order to enhance the robustness of the
classifiers. This also has been confirmed by our experiments
(cf. Section 6.4.3).
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first introduce the dataset and exper-
imental settings, then demonstrate our sample-based col-
lision attack for inferring classification rules, and finally,
evaluate our proposed evasion attacks and defense methods
for evading detection and robustness improvement of the
classifier.
6.1 Dataset and Experimental Settings
Dataset. We use two datasets (cf. Table 1), for evaluating our
collision attack. We tested 3,000 phishing websites using the
classifier GPPF. Among them, 305 can be detected by GPPF
(i.e., score ≥ 0.5). We use these 305 phishing websites as the
subjects to evaluate evasion attacks and defense methods.
9TABLE 4: Dom-related and Term-related features in GPPF with their semantics and attributes, where “*” refers to wildcard
Feature Types Del Add Semantics
1 PageHasForms 7 3 Whether there is a form element in the webpage.
2 PageHasTextInputs 3 3 Whether there is an input element whose type is “text”.
3 PageHasPswdInputs 3 3 Whether there is an input element whose type is “password”.
4 PageHasRadioInputs 7 3 Whether there is an input element whose type is “radio”.
5 PageHasCheckInputs 7 3 Whether there is an input element whose type is “checkbox”.
6 PageExternalLinksFreq 3 3 Computed as #external links
#total links
, where #total links is the No. of “href” attributes in “a”
elements and external links is the No. of “href” attributes in “a” elements whose domains
are external.
7 PageActionOtherDomainFreq 3 3 Computed as #actionsother domain
#total actions
, where #total actions is the number of the “action” attributes
in the form element and #actionsother domain is the number of “action” attributes whose
domains are external.
8 PageSecureLinksFreq 3 3 Computed as #secure links
#total links
, where #total links is the number of “href” attributes in “a”
elements and #secure links is the number of “href” attributes whose scheme is https in “a”
elements.
9 PageImgOtherDomainFreq 3 3 Computed as #imgsother domain
#total imgs
, where #total imgs is the number of “img” elements in the
webpage. #imgsother domain is the number of “srr” attributes whose domains are external.
10 PageNumScriptTags>1 7 3 Whether the number of “script” tag is greater than 1.
11 PageNumScriptTags>6 7 3 Whether the number of “script” tag is greater than 6.
12 PageActionURL=∗ 3 3 Whether there is a form element with the “action” attribute whose value is a string.
13 PageLinkDomain=∗ 3 3 Whether there is an “a” element with the external “href” attribute whose value is a string.
14 PageTerm=∗ 3 3 Whether there is a text node containing a string.
Settings. As mentioned in Section 1, we examined several
academic and industrial ML-based tools, all the other tools
(except GPPF) either are not publicly accessible or cannot
output decision score for each input which is required even
in our black-box scenario. Thus, we demonstrate our attacks
on the state-of-the-art ML-based classifier GPPF.
We use DEPOT TOOLS [55] to obtain the code of
Chromium (version: 72.0.3626), and use ninja [56] to com-
pile Chromium. We target the classifier GPPF which is
deployed in Chromium. To obtain the decision score of
each website, we added an instruction which prints the
return value of the function ComputeScore in the file
scorer.cc. We run Chromium in UI mode for our exper-
iments. Our experiments are carried out on a server (i.e.,
Ubuntu 16.40 or Windows 10) with 32 GB Memory and 1 TB
hard disk.
To demonstrate that our black-box attack is generic and
effective for other practical ML-based classifiers, we launch
transferability attacks on the industrial tool TrafficLight,
coming from BitDefender, a popular security company. It is
able to detect phishing webpages and part of the processing
is done in the cloud with some intelligent engines. Recall
that BitDefender TrafficLight is proprietary without any
publicly available information about the internal design and
implementations, hence completely black-box. However,
only 32 out of 305 seeds can be detected by BitDefender
TrafficLight. Thus, we use all the crafted adversarial samples
(32 × 3) from these 32 phishing websites as subjects. We
also tried to launch transferability attacks on other anti-
phishing tools, but failed to get their classification results
automatically.
TABLE 5: Comparison of inferred features
Feature
Categories
#Total
Features
#Inferred
Features
#Inferred
in [23] Time (h) Time in [23] (h)
URL-related 563 491 426 0.68 0.58Dom-related
Term-related 432 387 375 11.66 25.13
Total 995 878 801 12.34 25.71
6.2 Evaluation of Collision Attack
To evaluate the effectiveness of our sample-based collision
attack, we demonstrate on the classifier GPPF. We leverage
our collected phishing and legitimate dataset from PHISH-
TANK and PHISHNET in Table 1. We identify 995 hashed
features after analyzing Chromium, as shown in Table 5.
Our collision attack is able to successfully infer 878 features
(88.24%). We compare our sample-based collision attack
with the one proposed by Liang et al. [23]. Liang et al. use
URLs to infer URL- and Dom-related features, alphabets
and full-text corpora with seven languages to infer term-
related features. As their tool and sources of datasets are not
available for ethical consideration, we list the results from
Liang et al. [23]. Our collision attack inferred more features
(878 vs. 801) using less time (12.34 h vs. 25.71 h) than the
one in [23].
In detail, our collision attack successfully inferred 65
more (491 vs. 426) URL-related and Dom-related features in
0.68 hour, and 12 more (387 vs. 375) term-related features
in less time (11.66 h vs. 25.13 h), owing to our novel
collision attack. We also identified a new type of Dom-
related features called “PageActionURL” which was not
mentioned in [23]. We infer more term-related features than
[23], e.g., term-related features (1) containing numbers, (2)
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TABLE 6: Statistic of inferred classification rules
Rule Weight #Total #Addable Rule Weight #Total #Deletable
[-6.0,-7.0) 2 1 [6.0,7.0) 6 4
[-5.0,-6.0) 2 0 [5.0,6.0) 13 8
[-4.0,-5.0) 6 3 [4.0,5.0) 39 26
[-3.0,-4.0) 30 15 [3.0,4.0) 114 76
[-2.0,-3.0) 110 48 [2.0,3.0) 266 175
[-1.0,-2.0) 298 157 [1.0,2.0) 455 307
[0.0,-1.0) 359 203 [0.0,1.0) 430 345
Total 807 427 1323 941
involving Arabic, or (3) using degree as value such as “1◦”.
For ethical consideration, we do not provide details of con-
crete features. Those features cannot be easily inferred using
corpora, as done in [23]. Our collision attack successfully
inferred them because those terms are easy to be found in
real-world websites. In terms of time performance, to infer
the term-related features, [23] uses words with lots of noise,
thus needs much more time than ours. In summary, our
collision attack can crack more features using less time than
that in [23].
We inferred 1,952 (91.64%=1952/2130) classification
rules in total based on the inferred features. However, not
all of them can be used for evasion attacks because some of
them are related to appearance or functionalities or URLs.
Table 6 shows the 1,327 classification rules that can be used
for our evasion attacks, in which 427 classification rules
are negative classification rules that can be used for addi-
tion, and 941 classification rules are positive classification
rules that can be used for deletion. We remark that it is
unnecessary to fully resolve the features of these inferred
classification rules, as we can only know partial features of
some classification rules. Such classification rules can only
be deleted during evasion attacking. Therefore, classifica-
tion rule deletion is considered to be more effective than
classification rule addition.
6.3 Evaluation of Evasion Attacks
6.3.1 Effectiveness and Efficiency
To evaluate effectiveness and efficiency of our evasion
attacks, we respectively conduct white-, grey- and black-
box attacks against the classifier GPPF using 305 phishing
websites as seeds. The results of our proposed evasion
attacks are shown in Table 7. Column “Score” shows the de-
cision score range, with corresponding number of phishing
websites in Column “#Phishing Websites”. Columns “#Suc-
ceeded Websites” indicate the number of crafted adversarial
websites. Columns “Mutated Time” indicate the average
time spent on crafting the adversarial websites. Columns
“#Mutated Features/Rules” show the average number of
mutation operations (i.e., deletion and addition) for crafting
the adversarial websites, which also indicate query times to
the classifier. Remark that the number of mutated classifi-
cation rules is always larger than that of features, as when
one feature is mutated, classification rules that rely on this
feature are also mutated.
From the results in Table 7, we can see that our white-
and grey-box attacks achieve 100% attack success rate, and
our black-box attack successfully crafts 298 adversarial sam-
ples by only modifying DOM nodes for 305 seeds. (Note
TABLE 7: Performance of our attacks in white-, grey- and
black-box scenarios
Score #Phishing #Succeeded Mutation #MutatedWebsites #Websites Time (ms) Features/Rules
Performance of White-box Attacks
1 1 1 572.00 5.00/30.00
[0.9,1.0) 131 131 91.00 1.65/9.81
[0.8,0.9) 59 59 49.59 1.10/4.51
[0.7,0.8) 14 14 48.71 1.00/3.93
[0.6,0.7) 68 68 26.35 1.00/4.32
[0.5,0.6) 32 32 32.22 1.00/2.31
Total 305 305 - -
Performance of Grey-box Attacks
1 1 1 966.00 14.00/48.00
[0.9,1.0) 131 131 165.76 6.91/19.47
[0.8,0.9) 59 59 121.63 6.22/15.61
[0.7,0.8) 14 14 194.86 5.50/12.43
[0.6,0.7) 68 68 139.25 5.01/11.87
[0.5,0.6) 32 32 106.38 3.84/7.13
Total 305 305 - -
Performance of Black-box Attacks (node modification only)
1 1 1 606.32 24.00/50.00
[0.9,1.0) 131 124 244.96 7.54/19.76
[0.8,0.9) 59 59 206.34 3.15/9.76
[0.7,0.8) 14 14 291.00 1.79/7.93
[0.6,0.7) 68 68 231.97 2.21/8.14
[0.5,0.6) 32 32 219.94 5.32/10.03
Total 305 298 - -
TABLE 8: 7 phishing websites that fail to evade GPPF by
only modifying nodes in black-box scenario
Target Domain Score afterModification
#Addition
Operations
Mutate
Time (ms)
sso.godaddy.com/login 0.81 543 62.87
passport.alibaba.com/icbu login.htm 0.83 543 56.12
store.cpanel.net/login/ 0.84 543 60.10
store.cpanel.net/login/ 0.84 543 57.61
store.cpanel.net/login/ 0.84 543 58.27
passport.alibaba.com/icbu login.htm 0.90 543 60.76
passport.alibaba.com/icbu login.htm 0.93 1032 299.54
that in the black-box scenario, we first modify nodes and
then add nodes, while node modification and addition
operations may be mixed during mutation in white- and
grey-box scenarios. Although features are deleted first in
grey-box attacks, the feature deletion is achieved by node
modification and addition.)
The black-box attack failed to craft adversarial sam-
ples for 7 websites (cf. Table 8) by only modifying nodes.
Therefore, we continue mutating them by adding nodes.
Table 8 shows the results, which target five domains. Col-
umn “Score after modification” gives the decision score after
node modification. Column “#Addition Operations” gives
the number of node addition operations. Column “Mutate
Time” gives the time of node addition operations.
From the results in Table 8, we can observe that the
adversarial samples of all the 7 websites can be crafted
by node addition, using at least 543 steps. After a deep
analysis of these added nodes, we found that only one or
two classification rules are changed. This demonstrates that
node modification is more efficient than node addition in
black-box scenario. The most difficult website is the last
one whose initial decision score is 0.99. After modifying
all modifiable nodes, its decision score becomes 0.93, which
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TABLE 9: Classification rules that cannot be deleted in the
real case
Rule Features Rule Weight
1 PageNumScriptTags>6, PageExternalLinksFreq 0.55
2 UrlPathToken=∗ 2.23
3 PageNumScriptTags>1,PageNumScriptTags>6PageExternalLinksFreq 0.52
4 UrlPathToken=∗, PageHasForms 0.21
5 PageNumScriptTags>6, UrlPathToken=∗ 0.46
6 PageNumScriptTags>1, UrlPathToken=∗ 1.17
7 PageNumScriptTags>1, UrlPathToken=∗ 0.43
8 PageImgOtherDomainFreq 0.34
9 PageNumScriptTags>1, PageExternalLinksFreq 1.48
(a) Original phishing webpage (b) Adversarial sample crafted
in grey-box scenario
Fig. 4: Screenshots of two webpages targeting yahoo.
is still larger than the threshold 0.5. It takes 1032 times of
addition operations to reduce its decision score below 0.5.
Table 9 show the details of classification rules that are hit by
the website, but cannot be deleted. Column “Features” rep-
resents the features of each classification rule. Although we
delete many positive classification rules from the webiste,
the weights of the remaining classification rules hit by the
websites are still larger enough so that the decision score is
still larger than 0.5.
6.3.2 Visual Impact
To evaluate the visual impact of the mutated webpages, we
capture screenshots of all webpages of phishing and crafted
adversarial websites and compare each phishing screen-
shot with its adversarial ones using mean-squared error
(MSE) [35] and mean-absolute error (MAE) [36] criterion,
two common distortion measures of images. All the values
of MAE and MSE are 0, which demonstrates that our attacks
preserve appearance. We discuss two cases of visual impact
which respectively target Yahoo and PayPal.
Fig. 4 shows the screenshots of the original phishing
website targeting Yahoo (Fig. 4a) and an adversarial sample
(Fig. 4b), crafted in grey-box scenario. Our tool added seven-
teen PageTerm features, one PageImgOtherDomainFreq
feature, and one PageHasPswdInputs feature, deleted one
PageExternalLinkFreq feature and two PageTerm fea-
tures. Adding PageImgOtherDomainFreq and deleting
PageExternalLinkFreq features are achieved by adding
3,321 <a> nodes with internal href and 554 <img> nodes
with external href. The values of both MAE and MSE are 0.
Fig. 5 shows the screenshots of a phishing website
targeting PayPal (Fig. 5a) and an adversarial sample
(a) Original phishing webpage (b) Adversarial sample crafted
in black-box scenario
Fig. 5: Screenshots of two webpages targeting PayPal.
TABLE 10: Transferability of crafted samples
Attack #Detected/#Crafted Detection Ratio
White-box 32/32 100%
Grey-box 16/32 50%
Black-box 6/32 18.75%
(Fig. 5b), crafted in black-box scenario. Our tool deleted
threePageTerm features, one PageHasPswInputs feature,
and one PageLinkDomain feature. The values of both MAE
and MSE are 0.
Transferability Attack. As aforementioned, we evaluate the
transferability attack on BitDefender TrafficLight. Table 10
shows the results of the transferability attack on BitDe-
fender TrafficLight. We can observe that adversarial samples
crafted by the black- and grey-box attacks achieved 81.25%
and 50% transferability attack rate. In contrary, BitDefender
TrafficLight detected all the adversarial samples crafted
by the white-box attacks. This is because that our white-
box attack only made minor changes that are very specific
to features/rules of GPPF, whereas black-box attack made
more changes independent of GPPF, hence, is more robust
than others for transferability attacks.
As aforementioned, BitDefender TrafficLight is com-
pletely black-box and part of its processing is done in the
cloud with some intelligent engines, therefore it is impossi-
ble to find the reason why adversarial examples crafted by
our attacks on GPPF are still effective against BitDefender
TrafficLight. One possible reason is that BitDefender Traf-
ficLight may leverage similar features as GPPF to decide
whether a website is phishing or not.
6.4 Evaluation of Defense Methods
6.4.1 Evaluation of Similarity-based Evasion Detection
We evaluate both DOM tree similarity method and Pelican
against three evasion attacks. For each method, we com-
pare the similarity between the adversarial sample and its
original phishing website. We use the 305 original phishing
websites and their corresponding adversarial samples as the
subjects. Fig. 6 shows the results of similarity comparison
using two methods under three attacks. We can observe that
both DOM tree similarity method and Pelican achieve high
similarity (i.e., over 90%) on most of the adversarial samples
crafted by white- and black-box attacks. Surprisingly, on
the adversarial websites crafted by grey-box attacks, Pelican
significantly outperforms the DOM tree similarity method.
After a further investigation of these websites, we find that
there are 4 frequency-related features in GPPF, adding or
deleting these features needs to mutate a lot of nodes in
12
white-box grey-box black-box
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
sim
ila
rit
y
Pelican
Baseline
Fig. 6: Results of similarity comparison.
order to reduce/increase the frequency of some elements.
Hence, mutation of these features adds lots of invisible
nodes, which reduces DOM tree similarity by increasing the
number of nodes.
For example, a phishing website with domain “lo-
gin.microsoftonline.com.best10reviews.com” has decision
score 0.92. It hits a classification rule with weight 2.00 in
the classifier, the classification rule consists of two fea-
tures: “PageSecureLinksFreq” and “PageHasPswdInputs”.
“PageSecureLinksFreq” is a frequency-related feature, com-
puted as #secure links#total links . Currently, it equals to 1, indicating
that all the “href” links in the website are secure (i.e.,
“https”). In order to delete this feature, our grey-box attack
adds lots of insecure (i.e., “http”) and invisible “href” links.
Consequently, the DOM tree similarity is 46.78%, thus can
bypass the DOM tree similarity based detection. However,
such frequency-related features have no effect on Pelican, as
Pelican computes the similarity of the number of nodes in
the phishing website, instead of that in the crafted sample.
Thus, such websites can be detected by Pelican.
6.4.2 Evaluation of Subset Classification Rule Pruning
We found that GPPF has at least 150 addable negative subset
classification rules. Therefore, we conduct experiments on
GPPF without subset classification rules to investigate the
impact on attack cost and accuracy. To remove subset classi-
fication rules in GPPF, we set the values of such classification
rules to 0, as it is impossible for us to retrain GPPF.
Impact on attack cost. We automatically create 50 per-
sonalized phishing websites (10 websites in each decision
score range) as our subjects. Inspired by the 7 phishing
websites in Table 8 on which feature deletion fails to craft
adversarial examples in black-box scenario, we first collect
static webpages from legitimate websites and change the
action field of HTML forms in these websites for phishing,
then delete all deletable features, and finally add some
undeletable features to make their decision scores within
the desired range.
We compare the attack costs with and without using
subset classification rules in black-box scenario. Table 11
shows the results. We can observe that the attack requires
more operations to craft an adversarial sample in black-
box scenario without using subset classification rules, hence,
conclude that pruning subset classification rules can in-
crease the attack cost.
TABLE 11: Attack cost comparison with/without subset
classification rules
Score #Websites #Operations (With) #Operations (Without)
[0.9,1.0) 10 1331.7 3015.0
[0.8,0.9) 10 643.4 1028.8
[0.7,0.8) 10 418.2 967.0
[0.6,0.7) 10 273.5 353.8
[0.5,0.6) 10 212.3 221.0
TABLE 12: Single classification rules in GPPF
Feature #Deletable Total Weight #Addable Total Weight
PageTerm=∗ 23 43.42 14 -22.94
PageLinkDomain=∗ 16 39.96 20 -19.89
Total 39 83.38 34 -42.83
Impact on accuracy. We check all 305 original phishing
websites and 15,000 legitimate website using GPPF without
subset classification rules. Although, there are 2,017 legit-
imate and 232 phishing websites whose decision decision
scores changed after disabling subset classification rules, but
the changes are small so that none of them are misclassified
by the classifier.
6.4.3 Evaluation of Single Classification Rule Pruning
We found that GPPF has at least 34 addable and 39 deletable
single classification rules, as shown in Table 12. Therefore,
we conduct experiments on GPPF.
Impact on attack cost. To understand the impact on attack
cost, we conduct experiments in white-box and grey-box
scenarios by only using single classification rules for muta-
tion. We achieved 100% attack success rate using only these
single classification rules. An adversarial sample is crafted
in less than 1ms for the 305 phishing websites. Therefore, we
conclude that single classification rules have a potentially
severe hazard to classifiers, and should be pruned from the
classification rules in order to enhance the robustness.
Impact on accuracy. To understand the impact on accu-
racy, we set the values of all deletable or addable single
classification rules to 0 for all websites. We check all 305
original phishing websites and 15,000 legitimate websites
using GPPF. Although, there are 60 legitimate and 29 phish-
ing websites whose decision score changed after disabling
single classification rules, none of them is misclassified by
GPPF.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our study and
other suggestions for enhancement of classifiers.
Limitations. Our attacks are nondestructive, i.e., do not
change appearance and functionalities. This provides a
chance to defenders to add and enhance features by adding
appearance-related features. As shown in our experiments,
if the website contains many undeletable features and its
decision score is very large, it is relatively much more diffi-
cult to craft adversarial samples in black-box scenario. The
node addition operation in our black-box attack depends
on the nodes of the legitimate websites we collected. Thus,
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it is likely to happen that the collected nodes from the
legitimate websites are not comprehensive enough, causing
failure in black-box scenario, even though this situation did
not happen in our experiments.
Our attack assumes that the target classifier outputs
the decision score for each input test. This is possible
for client-side classifiers by leveraging reverse engineer-
ing techniques. For classifiers that cannot output decision
score, we could launch attacks in the white-box scenario
by deleting all the positive classification rules and adding
many negative classification rules in one step. However,
in the grey- or black-box scenarios, our mutation cannot
be guided by the decision scores. One possible solution
is to delete DOM nodes that occur frequently in phishing
websites but rarely in legitimate websites, and add DOM
nodes that occur frequently in legitimate websites but rarely
in phishing websites. We leave them as future work.
Furthermore, it might be able to improve resilience of
classifiers by proposing new classification rules or conduct-
ing adversarial retraining using crafted adversarial samples,
following disclosure of our findings. But, in both cases, our
attacks could achieve node manipulation via more complex
JavaScript code and Shadow DOM [53], which are widely
used in legitimate websites, but very difficult to analyze
statically. This might increase attack cost. On the other hand,
attackers can aggressively add or modify nodes to evade our
defense method, however, by sacrificing the appearance or
functionality of the websites, making them less convincing.
Moreover, our approach raises the difficulty bar for evasion
attacks.
For the defense method, Pelican is weak for the scenario
where attackers generate the crafted adversarial samples
directly rather than modifying the original one detected by
classifiers. Pelican stores the last k or the ones queried in
the last h hour, rendering the tool inefficient when k or h
are sufficiently large. This could be avoided by leveraging
cloud infrastructure, as done in Monarch [29].
Other Suggestions for Classification Rule Enhancement.
According to the characteristics of different features we
analyzed, we give advice to enhance the robustness of the
classifier GPPF. In node modification operation, the order of
attack cost is:
Term-related feature < Dom-related feature.
In node addition operation, the order is:
Term-related feature = Dom-related feature.
According to our experimental results, term-related features
are very weak, as it can be easily added or deleted, while
Dom-related features can be added, but only some of them
can be deleted. Therefore, (1) under attacks using node addi-
tion, it is better to combine term- and Dom-related features
with other features which cannot be added easily in negative
classification rules with low weights; (2) under attacks using
node modification, it is better to prune term-related features
and combine Dom-related features with other features that
cannot be deleted easily in positive classification rules with
high weights. In general, defenders should minimize the
use of term-related features and enhance existing classifi-
cation rules with appearance-related features, making these
classification rules difficult to be deleted or added without
changing the functionality and appearance of the websites.
8 RELATED WORK
Phishing website detection. Phishing website detection
has been studied in several work, such as blacklist [46], [4],
similarity-based [37], [8], [7], [9], [10], heuristic-based [5],
[42], and ML-based [6], [14], [16], [17] anti-phishing so-
lutions. The blacklist approach maintains a list of URLs
of known phishing websites, but it is only able to detect
phishing websites whose URLs are in the list. Similarity-
based approaches compare similarity between authentic
and phishing webpages, differing in terms of: features ex-
tracted to identify similarity and the matching algorithm
used. Heuristic-based approaches design specific detection
rules based on common characteristics of phishing websites.
Similarity- and heuristic-based approaches are able to detect
new phishing websites, although not greatly improve the
accuracy of other existing approaches [28], [45]. ML-based
approaches train a classification model using features/rules
from known phishing websites and authentic websites, dif-
fering in terms of: features for training and machine learning
algorithm used. They are scalable and accurate. We refer to
[45] for a survey of web phishing detection approaches.
However, blacklist-based classifiers are shown vulner-
able to evasion attacks by Oest et al. [4]. In this work,
we showed that ML-based classifiers are also vulnerable to
evasion attacks even in black-box scenario. We conjecture
that classifiers based on other approaches are also vulner-
able to evasion attacks, in particular in white- and grey-
box scenarios, for which the adversary can gain details of
classifiers.
The similarity-based approaches [37], [8], [7], [9], [10]
are closely related to our defense method Pelican. The main
differences are: (1) Pelican aims at detecting evasion attacks
rather than general phishing websites; (2) Pelican compares
the similarity between an unknown one and recently de-
tected phishing webpages rather than the similarity between
an unknown one and authentic webpages; and (3) we
compute similarity layer-by-layer and only need to record
recently detected phishing webpages due to (1), hence is
both time and space efficient.
Attacks on classifiers. Evasion attacks and poisoning at-
tacks are two main types of attacks on ML-based classi-
fiers. Evasion attack aims to evade classifiers by crafting
adversarial samples using various mechanisms and have
been exhibited in different scenarios such as malicious
PDF files [57], [19], [20], malware [58], [59], [21], malicious
websites [60], spam emails [61], and speaker recognition
systems [62]. However, domain-specific characteristics that
usually pose new challenges should be token into account in
different scenarios. For example, adversarial images usually
minimize distortion when adding pixel-level noise [58],
[63], and adversarial (PDF) malware usually need to keep
original malicious functionalities [21], [20] only. However,
adversarial phishing websites usually have to preserve both
appearance and functionalities which arise new challenges
compared with other scenarios. These new challenges po-
tentially make this research area less noticed and more
difficult. For instance, although the method proposed by Xu
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et al. [20] is generic for crafting adversarial samples. This
method leverages an evolutionary algorithm to mutate PDF
malware and relies an oracle to determine if a generated
variant preserves maliciousness. It is non-trivial to be di-
rectly adapted into our setting. In addition, in recent years,
attacks on deep neutral network based-classifiers are also
widely studied (e.g., [64], [58], [65], [22]), which have the
similar theory by leveraging adversarial images in machine
learning. In summary, all these existing studies consider
domain-specific scenarios with many differences compared
with ours in phishing website detection which owns new
challenges.
Comparison over the attack in [23]. The most closely related
work is Liang et al. [23], which proposes collision attack
to infer features and evasion attacks on phishing website
classifier GPPF. There are seven key differences.
1) The collision attack in Liang et al. [23] uses alphabets
and full-text corpora with seven languages to infer
features, while our collision attack infers features by
leveraging data from phishing and legitimate websites.
Experimental results demonstrate that our collision at-
tack is more effective and efficient than the one of [23]
(cf. Table 5.).
2) Our evasion attacks do not destruct the appearance and
functionalities of webpages, whereas the method in [23]
may do, making them less effective for web phishing.
For example, Fig. 7 shows the two webpages: the origi-
nal one (Fig. 7a) and the adversarial one (Fig. 7b) crafted
by [23], which is obviously illegal.
3) Our white-box attack leverages a greedy algorithm to
maximally decreasing the decision score at each muta-
tion step, while [23] only either adds positive classifica-
tion rule or deletes negative classification rules, hence
less efficient than ours.
4) The more important and practical yet more challenging
grey- and black-box attacks are not considered by Liang
et al. [23], while we propose effective and efficient grey-
and black-box attacks by leveraging a greedy algorithm.
5) We demonstrate transferability attack on the industrial
tool Bitdefender TrafficLight which is completely black-
box. Our attack achieved up to 81.25% success rate
using black-box attacks. Whereas, Liang et al. [23] do
not consider either the transferability attack or other
ML-based classifiers.
6) We propose defense methods against evasion attacks
which are effective to identify adversarial samples.
However this is not considered by Liang et al. [23].
7) We also propose two classification rule selection strate-
gies that are able to enhance the robustness of the
classifiers and increase the attack cost, which are not
considered by Liang et al. [23].
Poisoning attacks can fully manipulate almost all the
training data and features, and finally train a bad classi-
fier without abilities for classification [66]. Spam detection
and intrusion detection are always vulnerable to poisoning
attacks [67], [68]. However, we believe it is very difficult
to launch a poisoning attack on practical phishing website
classifiers (e.g., GPPF), as the training data of phishing
website classifiers is huge and its source is also diverse.
Defenses for classifiers. It is not surprising that many
(a) Original one (b) Adversarial one crafted
by [23]
Fig. 7: Visual comparison.
defense solutions have been proposed to enhance the ro-
bustness of ML-based classifiers. The protection of training
and features can help to train a more robust classifier and
increase the difficulty of evasion [69], [70], [71]. For example,
Saeys et al. [69] use ensemble feature selection techniques
and demonstrate that multiple feature selection methods
can receive more robust results. Biggio et al. [70] use multi-
ple classifiers to gain a better results in adversarial environ-
ments. GoodFellow et al. [72] re-train on adversarial sam-
ples to improve the robustness of classifiers, and highlight
that ensemble methods have some limitations for evasion
attacks. Zhang et al. [73] use adversarial feature selection to
increase the robustness of classifiers. In the area of malware,
Chen et al. [21], [74] propose a similarity-based approach for
filtering Android crafted samples by leveraging the most
benign and malicious samples. In addition, many recent
studies focus on identifying adversarial samples in deep
neural networks [75], [76]. These solutions are all preventive
in advance. However, all these studies are tailored to differ-
ent setting than ours. It is difficult to apply these solutions
to enhancing the robustness of phishing website classifiers
directly due to the domain-specific characteristics.
As for the client-side classifiers, the effective solution is
to increase the complexity of reverse engineering by using
more advanced obfuscation techniques. The less informa-
tion an attacker gets from a classifier, the safer the classifier
is. In terms of the defense solutions for phishing website
classifiers with evasion attacks, to our best knowledge, there
is no existing studies that focus on it.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we conducted the first systematic study on
evasion attacks of ML-based web phishing classifiers and
revealed their weaknesses. Specifically, we proposed a novel
sample-based collision attack which is able to effectively and
efficiently infer almost all the hashed features and classifica-
tion rules of the classifier GPPF. It is more effective and effi-
cient than the recent collision attack technique [23]. We also
proposed a class of advanced evasion attacks for three attack
scenarios (i.e., white-, grey-, and black-box) by leveraging
mutation techniques and the first defense method against
evasion attacks. We further presented two classification
rule selection strategies to enhance the robustness of the
classifiers and increase the attack cost. Experimental results
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demonstrated that our attacks can achieve 100% attack
success rate in less than one second per seed on GPPF, and
81.25% transferability attack rate on TrafficLight. Our
defense method is effective in detecting crafted adversarial
websites, hence can be used to detect evasion attacks and
enhance the robustness of classifiers. Our study shows that
sophisticated phishing attack is still a severe cyber security
vector.
Currently, our attack mutates seeds by leveraging a
greedy algorithm. In future, we plan to investigate attacks
by leveraging genetic algorithms, which have been used
to fool PDF malware classifiers [20], face recognition sys-
tems [77] and image recognition systems [78]. It is interest-
ing to understand which algorithm is more effective and
efficiency. Another future direction is to investigate attacks
against ML-based classifiers that only outputs the decision
result instead of decision score for each input test.
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